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Quantum Strategic Game Theory
Shengyu Zhang∗
Abstract
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend strategic games to the quantum setting, in
which we define quantum Nash and correlated equilibria and study the relations between classical
and quantum equilibria. Unlike all previous work that focused on qualitative questions on
specific games of very small sizes, we quantitatively address the following fundamental question
for general games of growing sizes:
How much “advantage” can playing quantum strategies provide, if any?
Two measures of the advantage are studied.
1. A natural measure is the increase of payoff. We consider natural mappings between clas-
sical and quantum states, and study how well those mappings preserve the equilibrium
properties. Among other results, we exhibit a correlated equilibrium p whose quantum su-
perposition counterpart
∑
s
√
p(s)|s〉 is far from being a quantum correlated equilibrium;
actually a player can increase her payoff from almost 0 to almost 1 in a [0, 1]-normalized
game. We achieve this by a tensor product construction on carefully designed base cases.
2. Another measure is the hardness of generating correlated equilibria, for which we propose
to study correlation complexity, a new complexity measure for correlation generation. We
show that there are n-bit correlated equilibria which can be generated by only one EPR pair
followed by local operation (without communication), but need at least log
2
(n) classical
shared random bits plus communication. The randomized lower bound can be improved
to n, the best possible, assuming (even a much weaker version of) a recent conjecture
in linear algebra. We believe that the correlation complexity, as a complexity-theoretical
counterpart of the celebrated Bell’s inequality, has independent interest in both physics
and computational complexity theory and deserves more explorations.
1 Introduction
1.1 Game theory
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics to model and analyze interactions of two or more
individuals, usually called players, each with a possibly different goal. Over decades of development,
game theory has grown into a rich field, and has found numerous applications in economics, political
science, biology, philosophy, statistics, computer science, etc. Many models have been proposed to
study games, among which the most popular and fundamental ones are strategic games (or games
in strategic or normal form) and extensive games (or games in extensive form). In the former, the
players choose their strategies simultaneously, and then each receives a payoff based on all players’
∗Department of Computer Science and Engineering and The Institute of Theoretical Computer Science and Com-
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strategies. In the latter the players choose their strategies adaptively in turn, and finally when all
players finish their moves, each receives a payoff based on the entire history of moves of all players.
Variation in settings exists. For instance, if before playing the game, each player also receives a
private and random input, then they are playing a Bayesian game, which belongs to the larger
class of games with incomplete information. See standard textbooks such as [OR94,FT91] for more
details.
Motivated by the emergence of Internet and other systems with a huge number of players,
various algorithmic and complexity-theoretical perspectives from computer science have been added
as one more dimension for studying games. See an excellent recent textbook [VNRT07] for more
background on this emerging field of algorithmic game theory.
Equilibrium as a central solution concept in game theory attempts to capture the situation
in which each player has adopted an optimal strategy, provided that others keep their strategies
unchanged. Nash equilibrium [vNM44,Nas50,Nas51]1 is the first and most fundamental concept of
equilibrium. A joint strategy is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player has any incentive to change
her strategy. If each player draws her strategies from a probability distribution, and no player
can increase her expected payoff by switching to any other strategy on average of other players’
strategies, then they are playing a mixed Nash equilibrium. Note that here we require no correlation
between players’ probabilistic strategies.
One important extension of Nash equilibrium is correlated equilibrium [Aum74]2, which relaxes
the above independence requirement. We can think of a correlated equilibrium being generated
by a Referee (or a “Mediator”), who samples a joint strategy from the correlated distribution and
sends the i-th part to Player i. Given only the i-th part, Player i then does not have incentive to
change to any other strategy. Correlated equilibrium captures many natural scenarios that Nash
equilibrium fails to do, as illustrated by the following two canonical examples.
The first example is a game called Traffic Light, in which two cars face each other at an
intersection. Both cars have choices of passing and stopping. If both cars choose to pass, then
there will be an accident, so both players suffers a lot. If at most one car passes, then the passing
car has payoff 1 since it does not need to wait, and the car that stops has payoff 0. The payoff is
summarized by the following payoff bimatrix, where in each entry, the first number is the payoff
for Player 1 and the second is for Player 2.
Cross Stop
Cross (-100,-100) (1,0)
Stop (0,1) (0,0)
There are two pure Nash equilibria in this game, namely (Cross,Stop) and (Stop,Cross). But there
is a fairness issue: Which car should cross, given that both cars prefer so? Or in the language
of games, which equilibrium they should agree on? There is actually a third Nash equilibrium,
which is a mixed one: Each car crosses with probability 1/101. This solves the fairness issue, but
lose the efficiency: The expected total payoff is very small (0); most likely both cars would stop,
and even worse, there is a positive probability of car crash. If one looks at the real world, things
are much simpler by introducing a traffic light. Each car gets a signal which can be viewed as
1Introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [vNM44] who showed existence of a Nash equilibrium in any zero-
sum game, existence later extended by Nash, a Laureate of Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, to any game with a
finite set of strategies [Nas51].
2Defined by Aumann, another Laureate of Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
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a random variable uniformly distributed on {red, green}. The two random signals/variables are
designed to be perfectly correlated that if one is red, then the other is green. This is actually a
correlated equilibrium, i.e. a distribution over {Cross,Stop}×{Cross,Stop} with half probability
on (Cross,Stop) and half on (Stop,Cross). It is easy to verify that it simultaneously achieves high
payoff, fairness, and zero-probability of accident.
The second example is a game called Battle of the Sexes, in which a couple want to travel to a
city for vacation, and Alice prefers A to B, while Bob prefers B to A. But both would like to visit
the same city together rather than going to different ones separately. The payoffs are specified by
the following bimatrix.
A B
A (2,4) (0,0)
B (0,0) (4,2)
Again, there are two pure Nash equilibria and the two parties prefer different ones, thus resulting
a “Battle” of the Sexes. A good solution is to take the correlated equilibrium, (A,A) with half
probability and (B,B) with half probability, generated by a mediator flipping a fair coin.
Apart from providing a natural solution concept in game theory as illustrated above, correlated
equilibria also enjoy computational amenity for finding and learning in general strategic games as
well as other settings such as graphical games ([VNRT07], Chapter 4 and 7).
1.2 Quantum games
Since there is no reason to assume that people interacting with quantum information are not selfish,
quantum games provide a ground for understanding, reasoning and governing quantum interactions
of selfish players, and it is thus important to investigate quantum games. The existing literature
under the name of “quantum games” can be roughly divided into three tracks.
1. Nonlocal games. This is a particular class of Bayesian games in the strategic form, such
as GHZ game, CHSH game, Magic Square game, etc. These games are motivated by the
non-locality of quantum mechanics as opposed to any classical theory depending on “hidden
variables”. In these games, each of the two or more parties receives a private input drawn
from some known distribution, and the players output some random variables, targeting a
particular correlation between their outputs and inputs. The main goal of designing and
studying these games is to show that some correlations are achievable by quantum entangle-
ment but not classical randomness, thus providing more examples for Bell’s theorem [Bel65]
that refutes Einstein’s program of modeling quantum mechanics as a classical theory with
hidden variables. See [BCMdW10] for a more comprehensive survey (with an emphasis on
connections to communication complexity). In recent years non-local games also found con-
nections to multi-prover interactive proof systems in computational complexity theory; see,
for example, [CHTW04,KKM+08, IKP+08,KKMV09,KR10,KRT10].
2. Quantization of strategic games. Unlike the first track of research motivated by physics
(and computational complexity theory), the second track of work aims at quantizing classical
strategic game theory. The basic setting for a classical strategic game of k players is as
follows. Player i has a set Si of strategies and a utility function ui; when the players take a
joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk), namely Player i takes strategy si, each Player i gets a payoff of
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Figure 1: The EWL model for quantization of strategic games
ui(s). There are various models proposed to quantize this classical model. The basic approach
is to extend each Player i’s strategy space from Si to the Hilbert space Hi = span(Si), and
to allow the player to take quantum operations on Hi. Eventually a measurement in the
computational basis is made to get a (random) classical joint strategy s, which decides the
payoff of the players by the classical payoff functions ui.
The approach was implemented in the seminal paper [EWL99] as follows; see Fig 1. There is
an extra party, called Referee, who applies a unitary operation J on |0〉 (in the Hilbert space
of dimension
∑
i |Si|), and partitions the state J |0〉 into k parts for the k players. The players
then perform their individual quantum operations on their own spaces, after which Referee
collects these parts, performs the inverse operation J−1, and finally measures the state in the
computational basis to get a random joint strategy s. Players i then gets payoff ui(s).
The EWL-model [EWL99] unleashed a sequence of following studies under the same model
[BH01b, LJ03, FA03, FA05,DLX+02a, DLX+02b, PSWZ07]. Despite the rapid accumulation
of literature on the same or similar model, controversy also exists. As pointed out in [CT06],
there are “ad hoc assumptions and arbitrary procedures scattered in the field”. We will
elaborate on this shortly.
3. Quantum extensive games. In a seminal work [Mey99], Meyer showed that in the classical
Penny Matching game, if (1) Player 1 is allowed to use quantum strategies but Player 2 is
restricted to classical strategies, and (2) the sequence of moves is (Player 1, Player 2, Player
1), then Player 1 can win the game for sure. This demonstrates the power of using quantum
strategies under some particular restriction on the other player’s strategies as well as the
sequence of moves. Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] initializes studies of the general refereed
game in the extensive form. The model adopted there is very general, easily encompassing all
previous work (and the model in our paper) as special cases. It has interesting applications
such as a very short and elegant proof of Kitaev’s lower bound for strong coin-flipping.
The generality makes the framework and techniques potentially useful in a broad range of
applications, though probably also admits less structures or at least makes it challenging
to discover strong properties. Other examples of quantum extensive games include [JW09,
GW10], which usually have a very small number of rounds.
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Figure 2: Classical strategic games: Referee samples a joint strategy s and send the i-th part to
Player i, who then applies a classical operation Ci resulting in a possibly different strategy s
′
i.
1.3 Our Results
Our goal is to study quantitative problems of general strategic games of size n in a natural quan-
tization model. To this end, we first give an arguably more natural model, and then study two
measures of quantum advantages.
1.3.1 Model
Despite of the prevalence, controversy also exists on the EWL-model. The main result in [EWL99]
was that a quantum strategy can “escape” the Prisoner’s dilemma, and this was obtained on the
assumption that each player is only allowed to apply a specific subset of unitary operations. As
pointed out in [BH01a], the assumption does not seem to “reflect any physical constraint (limited
experimental resources, say) because this set is not closed under composition”. Also shown in the
paper [BH01a] is that without the assumption, namely if the players are allowed to use arbitrary
local unitary operations, the proposed strategy in [EWL99] is not a quantum Nash equilibrium any
more. For this reason, we do not want to restrict players’ possible actions in any way; we allow
each player to take any quantum admissible operation (i.e. any TPCP map).
A bigger difference of the EWL-model and ours, illustrated in Figure 3, is that we remove
operation J−1 in the EWL-model. We find that this corresponds to the classical model more
precisely. Recall that in a classical strategic game, illustrated in Figure 2, Referee samples a joint
strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S from a classical distribution p on S, and gives si to Player i, who may
apply a classical operator Ci and output a possibly different strategy s
′
i. The players then receive
a payoff ui(s
′
1, ..., s
′
k). Note that different than in the EWL-model, Referee in the classical model
does not undo the initial sampling.
A related question is why not going to the more general setting by letting Referee apply an-
other joint operation K before the final measurement?3 Because classically Referee does not do any
3The same question in another form: Why not allow a general measurement instead of the measurement in the
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Figure 3: Our model for quantization of strategic games: No action of Referee after the players’
moves, and the operations by Referee and the players are general quantum admissible ones.
joint re-sampling after players’ actions as well — Referee’s role is simply to sample and recommend
strategies to players. Another advantage of not having K is that now fundamental concepts such
as quantum equilibrium (that we shall define next) will be only of the classical game under quanti-
zation, rather than also of an extra introduced quantum operator K. Last, if one really prefers to
have K, then which K to choose? In many games such as the two canonical examples in Section
1, Nature gives the payoff and Nature does not perform any joint measurement. (Consider for
example the Traffic Light game: After the two cars get the signals and decide their moves, they do
not send their pass/stop decision to any Referee for any joint measurement — They simply perform
the actions and then naturally face the consequences.) So even if one likes to study various K’s,
the case of K = I should be probably the first natural one to consider.
A final remark about the generality of the model: It is admitted that there are many ways
to further generalize our model (such as having the general measurement K discussed just now).
But models should not be simply measured by generality, otherwise Nash equilibrium should not
have been separately studied because it has so many (natural!) generalizations, and strategic
games should not have been separately studied because they are just a special case of extensive
games (two-move imperfect extensive games). Our goal was never to identify the most general
model (which probably does not exist at all), but to propose a model which is natural, simple,
fundamental, and hopefully rich in interesting questions — like the notion of Nash equilibrium or
the model of classical strategic games.
So our model finally looks like the one in Figure 3: Referee applies a joint operator Ψ on a
all-zero state to create a quantum state ρ, and gives the i-th part of it to Player i, who applies
Φi followed by a measurement in the computational basis. The players then receive their payoffs
according to the functions ui.
Without the referee’s action J−1, our model is simpler. In [BH01b], three criteria were raised
for an ideal quantization of classical strategic games given : (a) Si is generalized to Hi = span(Si),
(b) strategies in H are to be entangled, and (c) the resulting game generalizes the classical game.
Note that despite being simpler than the EWL model, ours easily satisfies all of them as well. One
may wonder whether ours is too simple to be of any mathematical interest. It turns out, as will be
shown in the following sections, that our model has many interesting mathematical questions with
connections to communication complexity, non-convex optimization and linear algebra.
The concept of equilibria can be naturally extended to the quantum case. Recall that in a
computational basis?
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classical game, a joint strategy s = (s1, ..., sk) ∈ S is sampled from a classical distribution p on S
and Player i receives an expected payoff Es←p[ui(s)]. A classical distribution p is an equilibrium if
no player can increase her expected payoff by any classical local operation. Now our model admits
an almost word-by-word translation of the above definition to the quantum case: A joint strategy
s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S is measured from a quantum mixed state ρ on H, and Player i receives an
expected payoff Es←ρ[ui(s)]. A quantum state ρ is an equilibrium if no player can increase her
expected payoff by any quantum local operation. Here the measurement is in the computational
basis S, only on which the utility function is defined in the first place.
1.3.2 Question
Other than the model, what also distinguishes the present work from previous ones is the generality
of the classical games under quantization. Most of the previous work focus on particular games,
usually of small and fixed sizes. For example, [EWL99,DLX+02a,DLX+02b,PSWZ07,CH06] consid-
ered the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, [MW00] considered the Battle of the Sexes game, and [Mey99]
considered the Penny Matching game, and there are many other studies on specific 2× 2 or 3× 3
games, e.g. [FA03,FA05,DGK+02, IT02,DGK+02], just to name a few.
In addition, most of the previous work focused on qualitative questions such as whether playing
quantum strategies has any advantage. While it is natural to start at qualitative questions on spe-
cific and small examples, it is surely desirable to have a systematic study on quantitative properties
for general games. In particular, our aim is to understand the following fundamental question on
general games of size n.
Central Question: How much advantage can playing quantum strategies provide, if any?
Depending on how the advantage is measured, we study the question in two ways, summarized
as follows.
1.3.3 Quantum advantage 1: Increase of payoff
Since games are all about players trying to get maximum payoffs, the first measure (of advantage)
we naturally take is the increase of payoffs. We shall consider natural mappings between classical
and quantum states, and study how well those mappings preserve the equilibrium properties. Recall
that a quantum state ρ in space H = ⊗iHi is a quantum correlated equilibrium if no Player i can
increase her expected payoff by any local operation. If further ρ = ⊗iρi for some ρi in Hi, then it
is a quantum Nash equilibrium.
Under this definition, we relate classical and quantum equilibria in the following ways. Given
a quantum state, the most natural classical distribution it induces is given by the measurement in
the computational basis S. That is, ρ induces p where p(s) = ρs,s. Not surprisingly, one can show
that if ρ is a quantum Nash (or correlated) equilibrium then p is a classical Nash (or correlated)
equilibrium.
The other direction, namely transition from classical to quantum, is more complicated but
interesting. A classical distribution p over S has two natural quantum counterparts: 1) classical
mixture: ρ(p) =
∑
s p(s)|s〉〈s|, the mixture of the classical states, and 2) quantum superposition:
|ψ(p)〉 = ∑s√p(s)|s〉. We regard the second mapping as more important because firstly, this is
really quantum — the first mapping is essentially the classical state itself — and secondly, this
mapping is the most commonly used quantum superposition of a classical distribution in known
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quantum algorithms, such as starting state in Grover’s search [Gro97] and the states to define the
reflection subspaces in Szegedy’s quantization of random walks [Sze04]. It so happens that it is
also the most intriguing case of our later theorems.
One can also consider the broad class of quantum states ρ satisfying p(s) = ρs,s, including the
above two concrete mappings as special cases. Now the question is, do these transformations keep
the Nash/correlated equilibrium properties? It turns out that the classical mixture mapping keeps
both Nash and correlated equilibrium properties, but the quantum superposition mapping only
keeps the Nash equilibrium property. As to the general class of correspondence, no equilibrium is
guaranteed to be kept.
Based on these answers, it is more desirable to study them quantitatively: After all, if |ψ(p)〉 is
not an exact correlated equilibrium but always an ǫ-approximate one, in the sense that no player
can increase her payoff by more than a small amount ǫ, then the interest of using quantum strategies
significantly drops. Therefore, we are facing the following question. (For proper comparison, assume
that all games are [0,1]-normalized, i.e. all utilities take values from [0,1].)
Question 1: In a [0,1]-normalized game, what is the largest gain of payoff by playing a
quantum strategy on a quantum counterpart state of a classical equilibrium?
The question turns out to be a non-convex program, which is notoriously hard to analyze in general.
Actually even the simple case of n = 2 is already quite nontrivial to solve. The maximum gain
turns out to be a small constant close to 0.2, but neither the analysis nor the solution admits a
generalization to higher dimensions in any straightforward way. For general n, there is no clue
what the largest gain should be. Nevertheless, we could show the following, among other results.
Theorem 1.1 1. There exists a correlated equilibrium p in a [0, 1]-normalized (n×n)-bimatrix
game s.t.
u1(|ψ(p)〉) = O˜(1/ log n) and u1(Φ1(|ψ(p)〉)) = 1− O˜(1/ log n), (1)
for some local quantum operation Φ1.
4 There is also a correlated equilibrium p with the
multiplicative factor
u1(Φ1(|ψ(p)〉))
u1(|ψ(p)〉) = n
0.585.... (2)
2. There exists a Nash equilibrium p in a [0, 1]-normalized (n×n)-bimatrix game, and a quantum
state ρ with ρss = p(s), s.t.
u1(ρ) = 1/n and u1(Φ1(ρ)) = 1, (3)
for some local quantum operation Φ1. The additive increase of 1− 1/n and the multiplicative
increase of n are the largest possible even for all correlated equilibria p.
Note that optimality is proved in the second part, and the upper bounds of the maximum gain
apply to |ψ(p)〉 in the first part as a special case. Closing the gaps between the lower bounds in
the first part and the general upper bounds in the second part is left open.
The main approach for Part 1 is to construct large games from smaller ones. What we need
for the construction is to preserve the equilibrium and to increase the “quantum gain”, the gain
4O˜ hides a poly(log log(n)) factor.
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by playing quantum strategies. It turns out that the tensor product preserves the equilibrium
property, and can increase the gain for small games with some parameters. The design of the base
games is also not straightforward: Taking the optimal solution to the n = 2 case does not work
because taking power on that game actually decreases the gain. In the final solution, the base game
itself has a very small quantum gain, but when taken power, the classical-strategy utility drops
much faster than the quantum-strategy utility, creating a gap almost as large as 1.
1.3.4 Quantum advantage 2: Correlation generation
We also study the quantum advantage from a complexity-theoretical perspective. As we have
mentioned, correlated equilibria possess game theoretical usefulness and enjoy better computational
tractability. But to really use such a good equilibrium, someone has to generate it, which makes the
hardness of its generation an interesting question. For this, we propose a new complexity measure,
called correlation complexity, defined as follows.
Take two-party case, for simplicity, where Alice and Bob aim to generate a correlation. Since
local operation cannot create correlation, they start from some “seed”, which can be either a shared
classical randomness or a quantum entangled state. Then they perform local operations and finally
output the target correlation. We are concerned with the following question.
Question 2: To generate the same correlation, does quantum entanglement as a seed
have any advantage compared to the classical shared randomness? If yes, how much?
Note that this question is, in spirit, not new. Actually the entire class of non-local games study
questions of the same flavor. However, a crucial part in non-local games is that the two parties are
given private (and random) inputs, which are necessary for differentiating the power of classical
hidden variable and that of quantum entanglement in previous non-local game results.
Without the private inputs, our model is simpler and thus more basic. An immediate question is
whether such a bare model still admits any separation of classical and quantum powers in generating
correlations. This paper gives a strongly affirmative answer.
Theorem 1.2 For any n > 2, there are correlations (X,Y ) which take at least n classical bits to
generate classically, but only need one EPR pair to generate quantum mechanically.
In proving the classical lower bound, we identify the nonnegative rank as the correct measure
to fully characterize the randomized correlation complexity. The nonnegative rank is a well-studied
measure in linear algebra and it has many applications to statistics, combinatorial optimization
[Yan88], nondeterministic communication complexity [Lov90], algebraic complexity theory [Nis91],
and many other fields [CP05].
The hidden asymptotic lower bound for randomized correlation complexity of a size-n correlation
is actually Ω(log n). The bound can be improved to n, the largest possible, assuming a recent
conjecture in linear algebra [BL09]. We actually have a bold conjecture that, with probability
1, a random correlation that can be generated by one EPR pair has the randomized correlation
complexity of n. Note that n always suffices since for any fixed correlation (X,Y ), the two parties
can simply share this very same correlation as the seed and output it. So “1 vs. n” is the largest
possibly separation; this is in contrast to Bell’s inequality that even infinite amount of classical
shared randomness cannot simulate one EPR pair. In this sense, the correlation complexity can be
viewed as a sublinear complexity-theoretical counterpart of previous non-local games.
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Coming back to the setting of games, two scenarios can happen depending on whether the
local operations are trusted or not. In the first scenario, consider the a generalized Battle of the
Sexes game, where Alice and Bob are not in the same city but want to generate some correlation
p = (X,Y ). There is a publicly trusted company C, which can help to generate p. Company C has
a central server which generates a seed and send to its local servers A and B, distributed close to
Alice and Bob, respectively. The local servers A and B apply the local operations to generate a state
which is then sent to Alice and Bob. Here the local operations are carried out by the trusted servers
A and B. And the complexity that we care is the size of the seed, which is also the communication
between the central server to the two distributed servers A and B. The separation of classical and
quantum correlation complexities directly applies to this scenario.
In the second scenario, the mediator sends the seed directly to Alice and Bob, who are then
supposed to apply the local operations Φ1 and Φ2 to generate the CE (X,Y ). But since now the
local operations are under the control of the players, they can apply some other local operations
Φ′1 and Φ
′
2. So the process is an equilibrium if no player has an incentive to apply any other local
operation. The above separation can still be adapted to separate the minimum sizes of classical and
quantum seeds in some games, but in general this scenario is more complicated and less understood,
leaving a good direction for future exploration.
1.4 More related work
The last decade has witnessed the advance of our understandings of the hardness to find a Nash
equilibrium in strategic games [DGP09,CDT09]. There has also been some studies for communi-
cation complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium [CS04,HM10], when each player only knows her
own utility function.
The problem of correlation generation in the asymptotic setting is considered in [Wyn75] for
the classical case and [Win05] for the quantum case. The paper [HJMR09] also studies the commu-
nication complexity for generating a correlation (X,Y ). But the model there takes an average-case
measure: Suppose Alice samples x← X and tries to let Bob sample from Y |(X = x), then what is
the expected communication needed (where the expectation is over the randomness of protocol as
well as the initial sample x← X)? For comparison, ours is a worst-case measure requiring that for
each possible x, Bob samples from Y |(X = x). And also note the essential difference that protocols
in [HJMR09] uses a large amount of public coins, which is exactly the resource we hope to save.
See the last section for more discussions on this.
After an earlier version of the present paper was finished and circulated, Yaoyun Shi firstly
pointed out the paper [ASTS+03], which studies communication complexity of correlation genera-
tion. The correlations studied there, however, are a particular type, arising from communication
complexity of Boolean functions, while ours considers general correlations. The second difference is
that [ASTS+03] only considers the communication complexity, but ours also considers correlation
complexity, the minimum shared resource (public randomness or entanglement) for generating the
correlation without any communication. It turns out that in the trusted local operation setting,
correlation complexity is the same as communication complexity, both classically and quantumly.
In the randomized case, we characterize them by nonnegative rank. The measures in the untrusted
local operation setting are of a totally different story: While correlation complexity is still sublin-
ear, there may not even be any equilibrium communication protocol to generate the correlation.
Last, the main body in [ASTS+03] studies a bounded-error generation, and showed an exponen-
tial separation (O(log n) versus Ω(
√
n)), while ours aims to generate the exact target correlation,
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and showed an “infinite” separation (1 versus log2 n unconditionally, and 1 versus n assuming a
conjecture).
Studies of computational issues of probabilistic distributions instead of Boolean functions has
recently be advocated by Viola [Vio10, LV10]. It is our hope that studies of the correlation com-
plexity of distributions later help to sharpen our understandings of various complexity questions
for Boolean functions.
Organization
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, after reviewing model for classical strategic
games and the definitions of Nash and correlated equilibria, we introduce the quantum model and
define quantum Nash and correlated equilibria. Other notation is also set up in the section. In
Section 3, we show how natural maps between classical and quantum states preserves equilibrium
properties, giving the proof of Theorem 1.1. Section 4 is devoted to the correlation complexity,
where we show proof of Theorem 1.2. In the last section, we point out quite a number of problems
and directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries, quantum model, and notation
Suppose X and Y are two (possibly correlated) random variables on sample spaces X and Y,
respectively. The size of bivariate distribution p = (X,Y ), denoted by size(p), is defined as
(⌈log2(|X |)⌉+ ⌈log2(|Y|)⌉)/2. Here we take the factor of half because we shall talk about a correla-
tion as a shared resource. It is consistent with the convention that when Y = X = R, we say that
they share a random variable R of size ⌈log2(|X |)⌉. For a two-party quantum state ρ in H1 ⊗H2
for Hilbert spaces H i of dimension Di, we also say that the size of the ρ, as a shared quantum
state, is (⌈log2(D1)⌉+ ⌈log2(D2)⌉)/2.
Sometimes we view a bivariate distribution p as a matrix, denoted by the capital P for emphasis,
where the row space is identified with X and the column space with Y.
A matrix A is called nonnegative if each entry is a nonnegative real number. For a nonnegative
matrix A, its nonnegative rank, denoted by rank+(A), is the minimum number r such that A can
be decomposed as the summation of r nonnegative matrices of rank 1.
Suppose that in a classical game there are k players, labeled by {1, 2, . . . , k}. Each player i has a
set Si of strategies. We use s = (s1, . . . , sk) to denote the joint strategy selected by the players and
S = S1×. . .×Sk to denote the set of all possible joint strategies. Each player i has a utility function
ui : S → R, specifying the payoff or utility ui(s) to player i on the joint strategy s. For simplicity
of notation, we use subscript −i to denote the set [k]−{i}, so s−i is (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk), and
similarly for S−i, p−i, etc.
A game is [0, 1]-normalized, or simply normalized, if all utility functions have the ranges in [0, 1].
2.1 Classical equilibria
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory. Roughly, it says that in a joint
strategy, no player can gain more by changing her strategy, provided that all other players keep
their current strategies unchanged. The precise definition is as follows.
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Definition 2.1 A pure Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S satisfying that
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k],∀s′i ∈ Si.
Pure Nash equilibria can be generalized by allowing each player to independently select her
strategy according to some probability distribution, leading to the following concept of mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 A (mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a product probability distribution p = p1 ×
. . .× pk, where each pi is a probability distributions over Si, satisfying that∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(s
′
i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si with pi(si) > 0.
Informally speaking, for a mixed Nash equilibrium, the expected payoff over probability dis-
tribution of s−i is maximized, i.e. Es−i [ui(si, s−i)] ≥ Es−i [ui(s′i, s−i)]. A fundamental fact is the
following existence theorem proved by Nash.
Theorem 2.3 (Nash, [Nas51]) Every game with a finite number of players and a finite set of
strategies for each player has at least one mixed Nash equilibrium.
There are various further extensions of mixed Nash equilibria. Aumann [Aum74] introduced a
relaxation called correlated equilibrium. This notion assumes an external party, called Referee, to
draw a joint strategy s = (s1, ..., sk) from some probability distribution p over S, possibly correlated
in an arbitrary way, and to suggest si to Player i. Note that Player i only sees si, thus the rest
strategy s−i is a random variable over S−i distributed according to the conditional distribution
p|si , the distribution p conditioned on the i-th part being si. Now p is a correlated equilibrium if
any Player i, upon receiving a suggested strategy si, has no incentive to change her strategy to a
different s′i ∈ Si, assuming that all other players stick to their received suggestion s−i.
Definition 2.4 A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a probability distribution p over S satisfying that∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(s
′
i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si.
Notice that a classical correlated equilibrium p is a classical Nash equilibrium if p is a product
distribution.
Correlated equilibria captures natural games such as the Traffic Light and the Battle of the
Sexes mentioned in Section 1. The set of CE also has good mathematical properties such as being
convex (with Nash equilibria being some of the vertices of the polytope). Algorithmically, it is
computationally benign for finding the best CE, measured by any linear function of payoffs, simply
by solving a linear program (of polynomial size for games of constant players). A natural learning
dynamics also leads to an approximate CE ([VNRT07], Chapter 4) which we will define next, and
all CE in a graphical game with n players and with log(n) degree can be found in polynomial time
([VNRT07], Chapter 7).
Another relaxation of equilibria changes the requirement of absolutely no gain (by deviating
the strategy) to gaining a little, as the following approximate equilibrium defines.
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Definition 2.5 An ǫ-additively approximate correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution p
over S satisfying that
Es←p[ui(s
′
i(si)s−i)] ≤ Es←p[ui(s)] + ǫ,
for any i and any function s′i : Si → Si. For such distributions p, we say that the maximum
additive incentive (to deviate) is the minimum ǫ with the above inequality satisfied. Furthermore, the
distribution p is called an ǫ-additively approximate Nash equilibrium if it is a product distribution
p1 × . . . × pk.
An m-multiplicatively approximate correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution p over S
satisfying that
Es←p[ui(s
′
i(si)s−i)] ≤ m ·Es←p[ui(s)],
for any i and any function s′i : Si → Si. For such distributions p, we say that the maximum multi-
plicative incentive (to deviate) is the minimum m with the above inequality satisfied. Furthermore,
the distribution p is called an ǫ-multiplicatively approximate Nash equilibrium if it is a product
distribution p1 × . . .× pk.
Note that one can also define a stronger notion of approximation by requiring that the gain is at
most ǫ for each possible si in the support of p. Definition 2.5 only requires the gain be small on
average (over si), but it is usually preferred because of its nice properties, such as the aforementioned
result of being the limit of a natural dynamics of minimum regrets ([VNRT07], Chapter 4).
2.2 Quantum equilibria
In this paper we consider quantum games which allows the players to use strategies quantum
mechanically. We assume the basic background of quantum computing; see [NC00] and [Wat08]
for comprehensive introductions. The set of admissible super operators, or equivalently the set of
completely positive and trace preserving (CPTP) maps, of density matrices in Hilbert spaces HA
to HB, is denoted by CPTP(HA,HB). We write CPTP(H) for CPTP(H,H).
For a classical strategic game as we have discussed so far, when being played quantumly, each
player i has a Hilbert space Hi = span{si : si ∈ Si}, and a joint strategy can be any quantum
state ρ in H = ⊗iHi. Since we want to quantize classically defined games rather than creating new
rules, we respect the utility functions of the original games. Thus we only talk about utility when
we get a classical joint strategy. The most, if not only, natural way for this is to directly measure
in the computational basis, which corresponds to the classical strategies. Therefore the (expected)
payoff for player i on joint strategy ρ is
ui(ρ) =
∑
s
〈s|ρ|s〉ui(s). (4)
In summary, the players measure the state ρ in the computational basis S, resulting in a distribution
of the joint strategies, and the utility is just the expected utility of this random joint strategy.
Corresponding to changing strategies in a classical game, now each player i can apply an ar-
bitrary CPTP operation on Hi. So the natural requirement for a state being a quantum Nash
equilibrium is that each player cannot gain by applying any admissible operation on her strat-
egy space. The concepts of quantum Nash equilibrium, and quantum correlated equilibrium, and
quantum approximate equilibrium are defined in the following, where we overload the notation by
writing Φi for Φi ⊗ I−i if no confusion is caused.
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Definition 2.6 A quantum Nash equilibrium (QNE) is a quantum strategy ρ = ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk for
some mixed states ρi’s on Hi’s satisfying that
ui(ρ) ≥ ui(Φi(ρ)), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
Definition 2.7 An ǫ-approximate quantum Nash equilibrium (ǫ-QNE) is a quantum strategy ρ =
ρ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρn for some mixed states ρi’s in Hi’s satisfying that
ui(Φi(ρ)) ≤ ui(ρ) + ǫ, ∀i ∈ [k],∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
Definition 2.8 A quantum correlated equilibrium (QCE) is a quantum strategy ρ in H satisfying
that
ui(ρ) ≥ ui(Φi(ρ)), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
Definition 2.9 An ǫ-additively approximate quantum correlated equilibrium (ǫ-QCE) is a quan-
tum state ρ in H satisfying that
ui(Φi(ρ)) ≤ ui(ρ) + ǫ,
for any i and any admissible map Φi on Hi. For such states ρ, we say that the maximum quantum
additive incentive (to deviate) is the minimum ǫ with the above inequality satisfied.
An m-multiplicatively approximate quantum correlated equilibrium (ǫ-QCE) of a nonnegative
utility game is a quantum state ρ in H satisfying that
ui(Φi(ρ)) ≤ m · ui(ρ),
for any i and any admissible map Φi on Hi. For such states ρ, we say that the maximum quantum
multiplicative incentive (to deviate) is the minimum m with the above inequality satisfied.
One can also extend the ǫ-QCE by allowing different ǫi for different i, resulting in {ǫi}-QCE. By
the linearity of admissible map Φi, of quantum utility function µi, and of expectation, it is easily
seen that for any {ǫi}, the set of {ǫi}-QCE is convex. In particular, the set of QCE is also convex.
Similar to the classical case, a quantum correlated equilibrium ρ is a quantum Nash equilibrium if
ρ is a product state.
A final remark about QNE: One may wonder why not allow separable states, namely ρ =∑
t pt(ρt,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρt,k) for some distribution p and quantum states ρt,i ∈ Hi. The reason is that
correlation then exists between players, so it includes the classical correlated equilibria as special
cases. Our preference here is to let QNE to cover NE and QCE to cover CE, but QNE should not
cover CE.
3 Translations between classical and quantum equilibria
This section studies the relation between classical and quantum equilibria. Basically we would like
to consider all natural correspondences between classical and quantum states, and see how well they
preserve the equilibrium properties. Thus there are two directions of mappings: from quantum to
classical and and from classical to quantum. We will first list the correspondences and study them
in detail in the subsections.
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For the first direction, the most natural way to get a classical distribution from a quantum state
is, as mentioned, to measure it in the computational basis:
p(s) = ρss, where ρss is the (s, s)-th entry of the matrix ρ. (5)
Next we consider mappings from classical distributions p over S to quantum states on H. There
seem to have more natural options. As far as we can think of, there are two specific mappings and
a big class of correspondences including the two as special cases.
1. classical mixture: ρ(p) =
∑
s p(s)|s〉〈s|, the mixture of the classical states. This is essen-
tially an identity map, though when playing the quantum game the players are allowed to
perform any quantum operations on it.
2. quantum superposition: |ψ(p)〉 = ∑s√p(s)|s〉. With the superposition, this is really
quantum and we expect to see some interesting and nontrivial phenomena. This is the most
commonly used quantization of probability distributions when designing quantum algorithms.
For example, recall that the starting state of Grover’s search [Gro97] and the states to define
the reflection subspaces in Szegedy’s quantization of random walks [Sze04] are both of this
form.
3. general correspondence: any density matrix ρ with p(s) = ρss satisfied for all s ∈ S. This
is the least requirement we want to put, and it is a large set of mappings containing the first
two as special cases.
Next we address the questions whether being equilibria in one world, classical or quantum,
implies equilibria in the other world, and if not, how bad it can be.
3.1 From quantum to classical
The following theorem says that the quantum equilibrium property always implies the classical one.
The proof is not hard; one catch is that what we know for ρ is that any quantum operation on Hi
cannot increase the expected payoff. What we need to prove is, however, a worst-case statement,
namely that for any Player i and any received strategy si, she should not change to any other s
′
i.
We just need to handle this distinction.
Theorem 3.1 (QCE ⇒ CE, QNE ⇒ NE) If ρ is a quantum correlated equilibrium, then p de-
fined by p(s) = ρss is a classical correlated equilibrium. In particular, if ρ is a quantum Nash
equilibrium, then p is a classical Nash equilibrium.
Proof Recall that we are given that µi(ρ) ≥ µi(Φi(ρ)) for all players i and all admissible super-
operators Φi on Hi, and we want to prove that for all players i and all strategies si, s
′
i ∈ Si,∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(s
′
i, s−i) (6)
for p(s) = ρss.
Fix i and si, s
′
i. Consider the admissible super-operator Φi defined by
Φi =
∑
ti 6=si
PtiρPti + (si ↔ s′i)PsiρPsi(si ↔ s′i) (7)
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where Pti is the projection onto the subspace span(ti)⊗H−i, and (si ↔ s′i) is the operator swapping
si and s
′
i. It is not hard to verify that Φi is an admissible super-operator. Next we will show that
the difference of µi(ρ) and µi(Φi(ρ)) is the same as that of the two sides of Eq. (6).
µi(ρ) = E[ui(s(ρ))]
=
∑
s¯∈S
〈s¯|ρ|s¯〉ui(s¯) =
∑
s¯∈S
p(s¯)ui(s¯)
=
∑
s¯i 6=si
∑
s¯−i
p(s¯)ui(s¯) +
∑
s¯−i
p(sis¯−i)ui(sis¯−i) (8)
µi(Φi(ρ)) =
∑
s¯∈S
〈s¯|Φi(ρ)|s¯〉ui(s¯)
=
∑
s¯∈S
〈s¯|
∑
ti 6=si
PtiρPti + (si ↔ s′i)PsiρPsi(si ↔ s′i)|s¯〉ui(s¯)
=
∑
s¯∈S
〈s¯|
∑
ti 6=si
PtiρPti |s¯〉ui(s¯) +
∑
s¯∈S
〈s¯|(si ↔ s′i)PsiρPsi(si ↔ s′i)|s¯〉ui(s¯)
=
∑
ti 6=si
∑
s¯−i
p(tis¯−i)ui(tis¯−i) +
∑
s¯−i
p(sis¯−i)ui(s
′
is¯−i) (9)
where in the last equality we used the fact that Pti |s¯〉 = |tis¯−i〉 if s¯i = ti and 0 otherwise; similar
equality used for the second summand.
Since ρ is a quantum correlated equilibrium, we have µi(ρ) ≥ µi(Φi(ρ)). Comparing the above
two expressions for µi(ρ) and µi(Φi(ρ)) gives Eq. (6), as desired. 
Many precious work try to find a quantum equilibrium with “better” payoff than all classical
ones, for example, to attempt to resolve the Prisoner’s dilemma by showing a quantum equilibrium
with payoff of both players better than the classical (unique) equilibrium. The theorem above
implies that at least in our model, this is simply not possible. We actually think that this should
be a property that reasonable quantization models should satisfy.
3.2 From classical to quantum: The classical mixture mapping and its concep-
tual implications
The implication from classical to quantum turns out to be much more complicated. Let us consider
the three types of mappings one by one. Recall that the first mapping ρ(p) =
∑
s p(s)|s〉〈s| is
the mixture of the classical states. The following theorem says that this always yields a quantum
equilibrium from a classical equilibrium. That is, the utility pi(s) cannot be increased for a classical
equilibrium even when player i is allowed to have quantum operations.
Theorem 3.2 (p CE/NE ⇒ ρ(p) QCE/QNE) If p is a (classical) correlated equilibrium, then
ρ(p) = Σs∈Sp(s)|s〉〈s| is a quantum correlated equilibrium. In particular, if p is a Nash equilibrium,
then ρ as defined is a quantum Nash equilibrium.
Proof Since the state ρ(p) is essentially a classical one, whatever operation on Hi, followed by the
measurement in the computational basis, only gives a new distribution over Si without affecting the
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distribution of s−i. Since classically changing the given si to any s
′
i does not increase the expected
payoff, changing si to a random s
′
i according to the new distribution does not give any advantage
either. 
The reason we still mention this technically trivial result is because it has a couple of concep-
tually important implications. First, together with Theorem 3.1, it gives a one-one correspondence
between classical Nash/correlated equilibria and a subset of quantum Nash/correlated equilibria.
This can be used with Theorem 2.3 to answer the basic question of the existence of a quantum
Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.3 Every game with a finite number of players and a finite set of strategies for each
player has a quantum Nash equilibrium.
Second, one also notices that there is a one-one correspondence between the utility values in
classical and quantum games. This immediately transfers all the NP-hardness results for finding
an optimal Nash or correlated equilibrium [GZ89] to the corresponding quantum ones.
Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 also help to answer a basic question about the hardness of finding a
quantum Nash equilibrium. One subtlety for quantum Nash equilibria is that it is a quantum
state, so we need to first define what it means by “finding” a quantum equilibrium: Is it sufficient
to generate one, or to fully specify the state by giving all the matrix entries. It turns out that these
two definitions are close to each other.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that there is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for finding a quantum
Nash equilibrium ρ, with the guarantee that every execution of the algorithm gives the same ρ. Then
there is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to solve any problem in PPAD.
Basically once having found a quantum Nash equilibrium ρ, one can use measurement in the
computational basis to get a sample according to p(ρ). Then taking an average of enough number
of such samples gives a good enough (an inverse polynomial, to be precise) approximation, and then
we can apply the hardness result of finding an approximate NE in [CDT09]. Details are omitted.
3.3 From classical to quantum: The quantum superposition mapping and its
extremal properties
The second way of inducing a quantum state from a classical distribution is by quantum super-
position |ψ(p)〉 = ∑s√p(s)|s〉. This case is subtler than the classical mixture mapping: While
an argument similar to that for Theorem 3.2 shows that the quantum superposition mapping pre-
serves Nash equilibrium property, it is not immediate to see whether it also does so for correlated
equilibria.
We consider to find the maximum incentive in two-player games, in which without loss of
generality we can assume that the second player always getting payoff 1. Indeed, any CE of any
other bimatrix game (A,B) is also a CE of (A, J). We will formulate the maximum incentive finding
problem over n×n bimatrix games (A, J) by an optimization in Section 3.3.1 and give solution for
the special case of n = 2 in Section 3.3.2. Then for the general bimatrix games (A,B), we will also
consider n×n bimatrix game with Player 2’s payoff being the all-one matrix, though our solutions
are also CE for bimatrix game (In, In), a natural extension of the Battle of the Sexes game.
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3.3.1 Maximum quantum incentive on |ψ(p)〉 as an optimization problem
ACPTP operation Φ by Player 1 followed by the measurement in the computational basis {1, 2, . . . , n}
gives a general POVM measurement {Ei : i ∈ [n]}. Suppose Player 1’s payoff matrix is A = [aij].
Then Player 1’s new payoff, i.e. the payoff for playing Φ, is∑
i,j∈[n]
aij
( ∑
i1∈[n]
√
pi1j〈i1|
)
Ei
( ∑
i2∈[n]
√
pi2j |i2〉
)
For simplicity let us use a short notation |√pj〉 for
∑
i∈[n]
√
pij |i〉. Then the above payoff is∑
i,j aij〈
√
pj|Ei|√pj〉. Thus the maximum quantum additive incentive on |ψ(p)〉 for a CE p can be
written as the following optimization problem.
Primal: max
∑
i,j∈[n]
aij(〈√pj|Ei|√pj〉 − pij)
s.t. 0 ≤ aij ≤ 1, ∀i, j ∈ [n] (The game is [0,1]-normalized.)∑
ij
pij = 1, pij ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ [n] (p is a distribution.)
∑
j
aijpij ≥
∑
j
ai′jpij, ∀i, i′, j ∈ [n] (p is a correlated equilibrium.)
∑
i
Ei = In, Ei  0, ∀i ∈ [n] ({Ei} is a POVM measurement.)
And the maximum quantum multiplicative incentive is the same except the objective function now
becomes (
∑
i,j∈[n] aij〈
√
pj|Ei|√pj〉)/(
∑
i,j∈[n] aijpij)).
Note that the objective function is highly non-concave5, which makes the problem generally
hard to compute or analyze. (The non-concavity can be witnessed by the optimal solution of the
case of n = 2 shortly.) One way for handling this is to fix some of the variables and consider the
dual of the remaining problem. If we fix A = [aij ] and P = [pij ], then it is a semi-definite program
with variable Ei’s. The dual of it is the following.
Dual(A,P ) : min Tr(Y )−
∑
i,j∈[n]
aijpij
s.t. Y 
∑
j∈[n]
aij |√pj〉〈√pj |, ∀i ∈ [n]
One can also write down the dual for the multiplicative incentive optimization primal by simply
changing the subtraction to division in the objective function; note that it is still linear in Ei’s for
fixed A and P . Sometimes working with dual helps to establish the optimality of the objective
function value on a primal feasible solution that we find.
5Sometimes people say convex programming for convex minimization, or equivalently as in our case, concave
maximization.
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3.3.2 Complete solution of 2× 2 games
We first study 2×2 games, which turns out to be nontrivial already, and the experiences we obtain
here will be useful later for general games. First it is not hard to see that in an optimal solution,
all aij ’s are either 0 or 1. Then one can see that only A = I2 or A =
[
0 1
1 0
]
may admit positive
incentive. Since permuting columns or rows will not change the optimal value, let us assume that
A = I in the following. We do not know whether A = I is also a maximizer for the general problem;
it is an interesting open question.
The equilibrium property implies that p11 ≥ p12 and p22 ≥ p21. By the requirement E1  0 and
E2 = I − E1  0, we can assume that the optimal value E1 =
[
a c
c∗ 1− b
]
, where a, b ∈ [0, 1], and
|c|2 ≤ min{a(1 − b), b(1 − a)}. Then the primal value is
〈√p1|E1|√p1〉+ 〈√p2|E2|√p2〉 − p11 − p22 (10)
= 2 ·Re(c) · (√p11p21 −√p12p22)− (p11 − p12)(1− a)− (p22 − p21)(1− b) (11)
= 2 · |Re(c)| · ∣∣√p11p21 −√p12p22∣∣− (p11 − p12)(1− a)− (p22 − p21)(1− b). (12)
where the last equality is because the optimal value is nonnegative and thus
Re(c) · (√p11p21 −√p12p22) ≥ (p11 − p12)(1 − a) + (p22 − p21)(1− b) ≥ 0. (13)
Further, in a maximizer, |Re(c)| should be as large as possible, so it holds that c ∈ R and either
c2 = a(1 − b) or c2 = b(1 − a). We claim that actually both hold and thus a = b. Actually, if
|c|2 = a(1− b) < b(1− a), then a < b, and it can be observed that the objective function increases
with a. So one can increase a up to b; the other case of a > b can be argued in the same way.
Now the primal value becomes
2
√
a(1− a) ·
∣∣√p11p21 −√p12p22∣∣− (p11 − p12 + p22 − p21)(1− a). (14)
By simultaneously switching the two rows and columns, one can assume that p11p21 ≤ p12p22. (We
need to switch rows and columns simultaneously because we have already assumed the matrix to
be I.) Then the optimal value is
OPT = 2
√
a(1− a) · (√p12p22 −√p11p21)− (p11 − p12 + p22 − p21)(1− a) (15)
≤ 2
√
a(1− a) ·
(√
p11 + p12
2
p22 −
√
p11 + p12
2
p21
)
− (p22 − p21)(1 − a) (16)
That is, we shift mass from p11 to p12 and the objective function always increases. This can be
done as long as the equilibrium properties is maintained, namely p11 ≥ p12. Since P is maximizer,
we know that p11 = p12. Thus
OPT = (2
√
a(1− a)√p11 − (1− a)(√p22 +√p21))(√p22 −√p21) (17)
≤ (2√a(1− a)√p11 − (1− a)(√p22 + p21))√p22 (18)
Thus if we shift mass from p21 to p22, then the objective function value increases. So the maximizer
p has p21 = 0, and we have
OPT = 2
√
a(1− a)
√
p11(1− 2p11)− (1− a)(1 − 2p11) (19)
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Now by looking at the partial derivative (and setting it to be zero), it is not hard to finally find that
p∗11 =
√
2/4 and a∗ =
√
2/2 give the maximum value (
√
2− 1)/2, which is the maximum quantum
additive incentive. The corresponding optimal solutions for the primal and the dual are as follows.
Additive OPT : (
√
2− 1)/2 = 0.2071... (20)
Primal solution : P =
[
p∗11 p
∗
11
0 1− 2p∗11
]
, (21)
E1 =
[
2p∗11 −
√
2p∗11(1− 2p∗11)
−√2p∗11(1− 2p∗11) 1− 2p∗11
]
, E2 = I − E1, (22)
Dual solution : Y =
[
1/2
√
p∗11(1/2 − p∗11)√
p∗11(1/2 − p∗11) p∗11
]
. (23)
The solution also confirms that the objective function of the Primal for additive incentive is not
concave. Indeed, by symmetry, another optimal solution for Primal is
P ′ =
[
1− 2p∗11 0
p∗11 p
∗
11
]
, E′1 =
[
2p∗11
√
2p∗11(1− 2p∗11)√
2p∗11(1− 2p∗11) 1− 2p∗11
]
, E′2 = I − E′1. (24)
But the average of the two solutions gives a negative objective value.
One may wonder whether the objective function is concave “with respect to” p, that is, if we are
allowed to take optimal E for each p. Unfortunately it is still not concave: Actually for (P +P ′)/2
there is not any positive incentive, as can be witnessed by the dual matrix
Y =
[
(1− p∗11)/2
√
p∗11(1− p∗11)/2√
p∗11(1− p∗11)/2 (1− p∗11)/2
]
. (25)
It can be easily verified that Y is a feasible solution for the dual, and it gives the value Tr(Y ) −
Tr(P ) = 0, which is an upper bound of the optimal value for this (P + P ′)/2.
Using a similar method, one can also find that the maximum quantum multiplicative incentive
is 4/3. The optimal solutions of the primal and dual are as follows.
Multiplicative OPT : 4/3, (26)
Primal solution : P =
[
2/5 2/5
0 1/5
]
, (27)
E1 =
[
2/3 −√2/3
−√2/3 1/3
]
, E2 = I −E1, (28)
Dual solution : Y =
[
8/15 2
√
2/15
2
√
2/15 4/15
]
. (29)
We have then completely solved the case of n = 2.
3.3.3 Lower bounds for general games
Next we will study game of the general size n and prove first part of Theorem 1.1. Note that the ad
hoc analysis used in previous part cannot be generalized in any straightforward way to the general
case. However, some insights obtained there are useful in the later construction.
20
We will exhibit a family of games and correlated equilibria p such that the quantum incentive
in |ψ(p)〉 increases with the size of the game. Before giving the construction, let us briefly discuss
the intuition. Suppose we already have a small game matrix A and a correlated equilibrium p
with positive quantum additive incentive on |ψ(p)〉. How to construct a larger game with a larger
quantum additive incentive? Note that we are to find a distribution p′ satisfying two requirements:
First, it is a CE of the larger game, and second, |ψ(p′)〉 has a larger quantum additive incentive.
It turns out that tensor product can satisfy both properties if the parameters are good.
Lemma 3.5 For two bimatrix games (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) with two correlated equilibria p1 and
p2 (of the two games respectively), suppose Player 1’s expected payoff on |ψ(pi)〉 is ui, and her
maximum quantum additive and multiplicative incentives on |ψ(pi)〉 are ai and mi. Then the
distribution p1 ⊗ p2 is a correlated equilibrium of the larger game (A1 ⊗ A2, B1 ⊗ B2), and the
maximum quantum additive and multiplicative incentives on |ψ(p1⊗p2)〉 are at least (u1+a1)(u2+
a2)− u1u2 and m1m2, respectively.
Proof Let us first show that p1 ⊗ p2 is a correlated equilibrium of (A1 ⊗ A2, B1 ⊗ B2). Given
any strategy x ◦ y of Player 1, where x and y are two strategies of Player 1 in games (A1, B1) and
(A2, B2), respectively, the conditional distribution of Player 2’s strategy is p1|x × p2|y, where p1|x
is the distribution of Player 2’s strategy in game (A1, B1) conditioned on Player 1 getting x (in a
sample from p1), and similarly for p2|y. Note that p1|x × p2|y is a product distribution, therefore,
Player 1 changing the strategy to any other x′ ◦ y′ does not increase her expected payoff, since the
expectation decomposes as the product of two expectations in the two small games, both cannot
be increased by changing strategies by the definition of correlation equilibrium.
Now we calculate the payoffs. The average payoff of Player 1 in (A1⊗A2, B1⊗B2) for strategy
p1 ⊗ p2 is
〈p1 ⊗ p2, A1 ⊗A2〉 = 〈p1, A1〉 · 〈p2, A2〉 = u1u2 (30)
If the maximum quantum multiplicative incentive on |ψ(pi)〉 are achieved by Player 1 applying Φi,
then the maximum quantum multiplicative incentive on |ψ(p1⊗ p2)〉 is at least m1m2, since Player
1 can at least apply the local operation Φ1 ⊗ Φ2. The additive incentive on |ψ(p1 ⊗ p2)〉 follows
similarly. 
We want to use the lemma d = ⌊logc(n)⌋ times, recursively, to construct a game of size n from
small building-block games of size c. First consider c = 2 and n being a power of 2; same asymptotic
bound holds for general n (by looking at the largest submatrix of size 2d). Some experiences from
the last section, such as A = I and p21 = 0, help to design the 2 × 2 game. But note that simply
taking the optimal solution of the 2× 2 games will not work since eventually the quantum additive
incentive will be (u1(Φ1(ρ)))
d − (u1(ρ))d = (
√
2/4 + 1/2)d − (1 − √2/4)d = o(1). To have the
additive incentive (u1(Φ1(ρ)))
d − (u1(ρ))d large, it needs u1(Φ1(ρ)) to be very close to 1. It turns
out that for a small-size game (I2, J2), if u1(Φ1(ρ)) is close to 1, so is u1(ρ). Thus the incentive in
the size-c game is actually very small, far from being a good solution of the small game.
With this in mind, we construct the game in the following way. Again define utility functions
of Player 1 and 2
A1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, B1 =
[
1 1
1 1
]
, (31)
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and a probability distribution
P =
[
sin2(ǫ) cos2(ǫ) sin2(ǫ)
0 cos4(ǫ)
]
, (32)
where ǫ is a small number to be decided later. It is not hard to verify that p is a CE with Player
1’s average utility being
µ1,old = tr(P ) = sin
2(ǫ) + cos4(ǫ). (33)
The induced quantum superposition state
|ψ(p)〉 = sin(ǫ)|00〉 + cos(ǫ) sin(ǫ)|01〉 + cos2(ǫ)|11〉, (34)
is not a QCE, because Player 1 can apply the unitary operator
U1 =
[
cos(ǫ) − sin(ǫ)
sin(ǫ) cos(ǫ)
]
, (35)
which has a general effect of
cos(a) cos(b)|00〉 + sin(a) cos(c)|01〉
+cos(a) sin(b)|10〉 + sin(a) sin(c)|11〉 →
cos(a) cos(b+ ǫ)|00〉 + sin(a) cos(c+ ǫ)|01〉
+cos(a) sin(b+ ǫ)|10〉 + sin(a) sin(c+ ǫ)|11〉 . (36)
So applying U1 on |ψ(p)〉 gives
U1|ψ(p)〉 = sin(ǫ) cos(ǫ)|00〉 + sin2(ǫ)|10〉 + cos(ǫ)|11〉, (37)
which has a utility of
µ1,new = sin
2(ǫ) cos2(ǫ) + cos2(ǫ). (38)
Now we apply the above lemma to define a large game by Ad = A
⊗d, Bd = B
⊗d and a
correlated equilibrium by Pd = P
⊗d. Recall that d = ⌊log2 n⌋. Let ǫ satisfy d = 4ǫ−2 ln(1/ǫ), which
gives ǫ = Θ(
√
log d/d). Using the above tensor product construction, we get a quantum additive
incentive of
µd1,new − µd1,old = (sin2(ǫ) cos2(ǫ) + cos2(ǫ))d − (sin2(ǫ) + cos4(ǫ))d (39)
= (1− sin4(ǫ))d − (1− sin2(2ǫ)/4)d (40)
≥ (1− dǫ4)− (e−d sin2(2ǫ)/4) (41)
= 1− (4ǫ2 ln 1
ǫ
+ ǫǫ
−2 sin2(2ǫ)) (42)
≥ 1− (4ǫ2 ln 1
ǫ
+ ǫ4−16ǫ
2/3) (43)
= 1−O
( log2 d
d
)
= 1−O
( log2 log n
log n
)
(44)
where the first inequality used the bounds sin(x) < x and 1− dx < (1− x)d < e−dx, for any x > 0,
and the second inequality used the bound sin(x) ≥ x− x3/6 for x > 0.
For the multiplicative incentive, we can simply take the 2× 2 game with the maximum multi-
plicative quantum incentive, 4/3, in the last section. The resulting multiplicative quantum incentive
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is then (4/3)log2 n = nlog2(4/3) = n0.4150.... This falls short of the promise in Theorem 1.1. We now
give another construction for general dimension c, which yields a better multiplicative incentive.
Consider the following c × c bimatrix game. The utility function is still A1 = Ic, B1 = Jc, and
define a distribution p by
pij =
{
0 i− j = 1 mod c
1
c2−c
otherwise
(45)
where i, j range over {0, 1, . . . , c−1}. It is routine to check that it is indeed a correlated equilibrium,
and Player 1’s current utility is c · 1/(c2 − c) = 1/(c − 1). Let the POVM {E0, . . . , Ec−1} be
Ei = |ψi〉〈ψi|, where the i′-th entry of vector |ψi〉 is ψi,i′ =
{
2−c
c i
′ − i = 1 mod c
2
c otherwise
. (46)
It is a valid POVM measurement:
∑
i
Ei(j, j) =
(
2− c
c
)2
+ (c− 1)
(
2
c
)2
= 1, ∀j, (47)
and ∑
i
Ei(j, j
′) = 2 · 2− c
c
· 2
c
+ (c− 2)
(
2
c
)2
= 0, ∀j 6= j′. (48)
Now the new probability is
p′ij =
∑
i1,i2
√
pi1,jpi2,jEi(i1, i2). (49)
and the new utility is ∑
i
∑
i1,i2
√
pi1,ipi2,iEi(i1, i2) (50)
=
∑
i
∑
i1 6=i+1,i2 6=i+1
1
c2 − c
(
2
c
)2
(51)
= c · (c− 1)2 · 4
c3(c− 1) (52)
=
4(c− 1)
c2
(53)
So the multiplicative incentive is 4(c− 1)2/c2. By the same tensor product construction, we get an
n× n game with multiplicative incentive(4(c− 1)
c2
)logc(n)
= n
2+2 log2(1−1/c)
log2 c . (54)
Optimizing this over integers c, we get a quantum multiplicative incentive nlog2(3)−1 = n0.585... at
c = 4.
A final remark for this section is that both lower bounds, for the maximum additive and
multiplicative incentives, can be achieved even by symmetric games. Indeed, it is not hard to verify
that the probability distributions P⊗d with P given in Eq. (32) and Eq. (45) are still correlated
equilibria for the game (I, I), a natural extension of Battle of the Sexes game in Section 1.
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3.4 From classical to quantum: General mappings and their extremal properties
Finally, for the general mapping, i.e. an arbitrary quantum state ρ with p(s) = ρss satisfied, the
equilibrium property can be heavily destroyed, even if p is uncorrelated. We can pin down the
exact maximum quantum additive and multiplicative incentives.
Theorem 3.6 (p NE ; ρ QCE) There exist ρ and p satisfying that p(s) = ρss, p is a Nash
equilibrium, but ρ is not even a quantum correlated equilibrium. The maximum quantum additive
incentive in a normalized (m×n)-bimatrix game is 1−1/min{m,n}, and the maximum multiplica-
tive incentive is min{m,n} even for correlated equilibria p.
The theorem is a corollary of the next more general one.
Theorem 3.7 Suppose p is a correlated equilibrium for a normalized n-player game and ρ satisfies
ρss = p(s), ∀s ∈ S. Then the maximum quantum additive incentive is at most 1 − ǫi and the
maximum quantum multiplicative incentive is at most 1/ǫi, where ǫi = max{|Si|−1, |S−i|−1}. Both
bounds are achievable even by some Nash equilibrium p.
Proof Suppose Player i applies operation Ψi on ρ, resulting in a distribution λ on S when the
players measure the state in the computational basis. Sine local operation cannot change other
parties’ density operator, the marginal distribution of λ on S−i is still p−i. The new payoff for
Player i is ‖u ◦ λ‖1, where ‖ · ‖1 is the sum of entries in absolute value. We are going to prove that
the original payoff for Player i is at least ǫi fraction of the new payoff; that is,
‖u ◦ p‖1 ≥ ǫi‖u ◦ λ‖1. (55)
This would imply the claimed bound for multiplicative incentive, and the additive incentive follows:
(1− ǫi)‖u ◦ λ‖1 ≤ 1− ǫi since u is normalized.
Now we prove the above inequality. First consider the case of ǫi = |S−i|−1. For each s−i ∈ S−i,
define a probability distribution p
s−i
i over Si by p
s−i
i (si) = λ(sis−i)/p−i(s−i). Then
‖u ◦ (ps−ii × p−i)‖1 =
∑
si,s′−i
λ(s)
p−i(s−i)
u(si, s
′
−i)p−i(s
′
−i) ≥
∑
si
λ(sis−i)u(si, s−i) (56)
where in the last step we dropped the summands for all s′−i 6= s−i. Now define
p¯i =
1
|S−i|
∑
s−i∈S−i
p
s−i
i , (57)
the average the these distributions p
s−i
i . Since p is a correlated equilibrium, Player i cannot increase
her expected payoff by switching to p¯i. So
‖u ◦ p‖1 ≥ ‖u ◦ (p¯ip−i)‖1 = 1|S−i|
∑
s−i
‖u ◦ (ps−ii p−i)‖1 (58)
≥ 1|S−i|
∑
si,s−i
λ(sis−i)u(si, s−i) =
1
|S−i|‖u ◦ λ‖1. (59)
where the first equality is by noting that all matrices here are nonnegative.
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For the case of ǫi = |Si|−1, take the uniform distribution qi over Si, then by the similar argument
as above, we have
‖u ◦ p‖1 ≥ ‖u ◦ (qi × p−i)‖1 = 1|Si|
∑
si,s−i
u(sis−i)p−i(s−i). (60)
Now note that p−i is the marginal distribution of λ on S−i, thus p−i(s−i) ≥ λ(sis−i), and
‖u ◦ p‖1 ≥ 1|Si|
∑
si,s−i
u(sis−i)λ(sis−i) =
1
|Si|‖u ◦ λ‖1. (61)
as desired.
We next show that the bounds in the above theorem is achievable even by a Nash equilibrium
p. Assume that |Si| = |S−i| = n, then there is a one-one correspondence π : S−i → Si. Consider
the following n-player game:
ui(s) =
{
1 if si = π(s−i)
0 otherwise
, uj(s) = 1, ∀j 6= i. (62)
Consider the state
|ψ〉 = (FSi ⊗ IS−i)|ψ′〉, with |ψ′〉 =
1√
n
∑
s−i∈S−i
|π(s−i)s−i〉 (63)
where FSi is the Fourier transform operator on the register corresponding to Si (and IS−i is the
identity on the rest). If we measure |ψ〉, then we get a uniform distribution over the n2 joint
strategies. This is a Nash equilibrium, since if all other [n]− {i} players choose a random strategy
in S−i, then Player i is indifferent in all her n strategies in Si.
However, |ψ〉 is not a quantum (even correlated) Nash equilibrium, because Player i can apply
the inverse Fourier transform on |ψ〉 to get |ψ′〉, which gives Player i payoff 1 if the players measure
the state. The gained payoff by this local operation is 1− 1/n = 1− ǫi. 
4 Separation in classical and quantum correlation complexity of
correlated equilibria
This section studies the correlation from its generation. First observe that all correlations are
correlated equilibria for some game. Actually, for any given probability distribution p on S, for any
si, let
s∗−i = the lexicographically first maximizer for maxs−i
p(sis−i). (64)
Define the utility function to be
ui(s) =
{
1 if s−i = s
∗
−i
0 otherwise
. (65)
Then it is easy to verify that p is a correlated equilibrium. Thus the problem of generating correlated
equilibria is as general as that of generating an arbitrary correlation.
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Figure 4: Correlated equilibrium generation with trusted local operations
Consider the following scenario for correlation generation. Two parties, Alice and Bob, share
some “seed” correlation initially, and then perform local operations on their own systems. Different
resources can serve as the seed correlation; in particular, it can be shared (classical) randomness
and entangled (quantum) states.
In the setting of games, two scenarios can be considered, depending on whether the local
operations are carried out by trusted parties or untrusted players. We will discuss these models in
the next two subsections.
4.1 Correlated equilibrium generation: trusted local operation model
To illustrate the trusted local operation model, consider the a generalized Battle of the Sexes game,
where Alice and Bob are not in the same city but want to generate some correlation p = (X,Y ).
There is a publicly trusted company C, which can help to generate p. Company C has a central
server which generates a seed and send to its local servers A and B, distributed close to Alice and
Bob, respectively. The local servers A and B apply the local operations to generate a state which
is then sent to Alice and Bob. Here the local operations are carried out by the trusted servers A
and B. And the complexity that we care is the size of the seed, which is also the communication
between the central server to the two distributed servers A and B.
More precisely, in the classical case, the two parties Alice and Bob initially have random variables
SA and SB , respectively, which may be correlated in an arbitrary way. They can also use private
randomness RA and RB , respectively. The two parties then apply local operations on their own
systems. The joint output is then a pair of (correlated) random variables (X,Y ) where X =
fA(SA, RA) and Y = fB(SB , RB) for some functions fA and fB. In the quantum setting, the two
parties initially share a state ρ, and they then apply local operations and output a pair of classical
random variables (X,Y ).
Definition 4.1 The randomized correlation complexity of a distribution p is the minimum size
of shared random variables (X ′, Y ′) given which Alice and Bob can apply local operations (but no
communications) and output X and Y , respectively, such that (X,Y ) is distributed according to p.
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The quantum correlation complexity is defined in the same way with the initially shared (X ′, Y ′)
being a quantum entangled state. We use RCorr(p) and QCorr(p) to denote the randomized and
quantum correlation complexity of p.
We can also define the private-coin randomized (and quantum, respectively) communication
complexity of distribution p, which is the minimum number of bits (and qubits, respectively)
exchanged such that at the end of the protocol, Alice outputs X and Bob outputs Y with (X,Y )
distributed according to p. Note that no seed correlation is allowed in this case; that is why we
call it private-coin. We use RComm(p) and QComm(p) to denote the private-coin randomized and
quantum communication complexity of p.
Some remarks are in order. First, recall that the size of the seed correlation (X ′, Y ′) is half of the
number of bits of (X ′, Y ′), consistent with the convention that the size of public-coin string is the
number of bits of R which Alice and Bob share. Second, since (even one-way) communication can
easily simulate the shared randomness/entanglement (by one party generating the shared resource
and sending part of it to the other party), we have RComm(p) ≤ RCorr(p) and QComm(p) ≤
QCorr(p). It turns out that actually equality holds in both cases. However we still define the
correlation complexity because it is a natural model and it is easier to bound (for example, in the
later Theorem 4.2). Third, as we mentioned, Alice and Bob can always share the target correlation
as the seed, so QCorr(p) ≤ RCorr(p) ≤ size(p). Finally, using a round-by-round argument, one
can prove that QComm(p) ≥ I(p)/2 where I(p) is the mutual information I(X,Y ) for (X,Y )← p.
Putting all these together, we have
I(p)
2
≤ QComm(p) = QCorr(p) ≤ RComm(p) = RCorr(p) ≤ size(p). (66)
Remark The QComm(p) = QCorr(p) was pointed out firstly by Nayak (private communication),
who observed that the argument in Kremer’s thesis [Kre95] (which was in turn attributed to Yao)
implies that the Schmidt rank of a joint state generated by c-qubit communication (without prior
entanglement) is at most 2c.
We next relate the quantum and classical correlation complexities to standard and nonnegative
ranks, respectively.
Theorem 4.2
1
4
log2 rank(P ) ≤ QCorr(p) ≤ min
Q: Q◦Q¯=P
log2 rank(Q), (67)
and the upper bound can be achieved by (local) unitary operations followed by a measurement in the
computational basis.
Proof Lower bound: Suppose the seed state is ρ = µi
∑2q
i=1 |ψi〉〈ψi|, where q = 2r = 2QCorr(p)
and |ψi〉’s are pure states. Further apply Schmidt decomposition on each |ψi〉:
|ψi〉 =
2r∑
j=1
λij |ψij〉 ⊗ |φij〉, (68)
where |ψij〉 and |φij〉 are in Alice’s and Bob’s sides, respectively. Now whatever local operations Alice
and Bob apply (for generating a distribution p) can be formulated as general POVM measurements
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{Ex} and {Fy}, respectively, resulting in
p(x, y) =
∑
i
µi
〈
Ex ⊗ Ey, |ψi〉〈ψi|
〉
=
∑
ijk
µiλijλik〈ψik|Ex|ψij〉 · 〈φik|Ey|φij〉 (69)
Therefore P can be written as the summation of 2q+r+r = 24r rank-1 matrices, i.e. rank(P ) ≤ 24r.
Upper bound: Consider the singular value decomposition of Q: Q =
∑r
i=1 σi|ui〉〈vi|, where
σi > 0, r = rank(Q), |ui〉 and |vi〉 are unit length vectors. Observe that∑
i
σ2i = ‖Q‖2F =
∑
x,y
|Q(x, y)|2 =
∑
x,y
Q(x, y)Q¯(x, y) (70)
=
∑
x,y
(Q ◦ Q¯)(x, y) =
∑
x,y
P (x, y) = 1. (71)
Now let Alice and Bob share the state |ψ〉 =∑ri=1 σi|i〉 ⊗ |i〉, which is a valid pure state because of
the equality above. Then Alice applies U and Bob applies V , where U and V are unitary matrices
the i-th columns of which are |ui〉 and |v¯i〉, respectively. Then a measurement in the computational
basis gives (x, y) with probability∣∣∣∑
i
σi〈x|ui〉〈y|v¯i〉
∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∑
i
σi〈x|ui〉〈vi|y〉
∣∣∣2 = |Q(x, y)|2 = Q(x, y)Q¯(x, y) = P (x, y), (72)
as desired. 
An application of the lower bound is to separate the quantum correlation complexity and mutual
information, namely, the aforementioned lower bound I(p)/2 ≤ QCorr(p) can be quite loose.
Proposition 4.3 There is a correlated distribution p with I(p) = O(n−1/3) and QCorr(p) ≥
1
4 log2(n+ 1).
Proof In [HJMR09], the following distribution is defined to separate mutual information and
another two measures C(p) and T (p) which we will not give details but only mention that both are
lower bounds for RComm(p). The distribution p is defined on {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n:
p(x, y) =
|{i : xi = yi}|
n
· 21−2n (73)
and they showed that I(p) = O(n−1/3). Here we can separate I(p) and QCorr(p) by showing
that rank(P ) = n + 1 and thus QCorr(p) ≥ 14 log2(n + 1). Indeed, consider the submatrix of size
(n+1)×(n+1) where the indices x, y ∈ {0n, 10n−1, 110n−2, · · · , 1n}. The submatrix, after a proper
scaling, is the following one 

1 1− 1/n 1− 2/n · · · 0
1− 1/n 1 1− 1/n · · · 1/n
1− 2/n 1− 1/n 1 · · · 2/n
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 1/n 2/n · · · 1

 . (74)
By subtracting each row from its next one, it is not hard to see that the rank of this is n+ 1. 
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Next we fully characterize the randomized correlation and communication complexity by non-
negative rank. The argument of the lower bound was essentially known before (for example, in
proving the Cut-and-Paste lemma in [BYJKS04]), here we observe that the argument also yields a
lower bound for nonnegative rank. We include it for the completeness.
Theorem 4.4 RComm(p) = RCorr(p) = ⌈log2 rank+(P )⌉.
Proof We shall prove that RCorr(p) ≤ ⌈log2 rank+(P )⌉ and RComm(p) ≥ ⌈log2 rank+(P )⌉. The
conclusion then follows by the bound RComm(p) ≤ RCorr(p).
Upper bound for RCorr(p): By definition of rank+(P ), we can decompose P s.t. P (x, y) =
K
∑r
i=1 qiai(x)bi(y) where q, ai’s and bi’s are all probability distributions, K > 0 is a global
normalization factor, and r = rank+(P ). By summing over all (x, y) and compare the above
equality, it is easily seen that actually K = 1. Therefore, Alice and Bob can sample from P by first
sharing a random i distributed according to q, and Alice sampling x from ai, Bob sampling y from
bi.
Lower bound for RComm(p): Suppose p can be generated by an r-round protocolM = (M1, . . . ,Mr)
where the random variableMi is the message in the i-th message. Alice uses private randomness rA
and Bob uses private randomness rB . Without loss of generality, suppose Alice starts the protocol
by sending M1. Let c be the total number of bits exchanged. At the end of the protocol Alice
outputs X and Bob outputs Y . Let m range over the set of possible message. Then
p(x, y) =
∑
m
PrrA,rB [M = m]PrrA,rB [X = x, Y = y|M = m] (75)
Expand the probability PrrA,rB [M = m] by conditional probabilities in a round-by-round manner,
we have
PrrA,rB [M = m] = PrrA [M1 = m1] ·PrrB [M2 = m2|M1 = m1] · . . .
·Pr[Mr = mr|M1 . . .Mr−1 = m1 . . . mr−1] (76)
where the last probability is over either rA or rB , depending on the parity of r. Finally noting that
PrrA,rB [X = x, Y = y|M = m] = PrrA [X = x|M = m] ·PrrB [Y = y|M = m] since conditioned on
a fixed message m, the Alice and Bob’s outputs are independent. Rearranging the terms gives
p(x, y) =
∑
m
(
PrrA [X = x|M = m] ·
∏
i∈[r]:odd
PrrA [Mi = mi|Mi−1 = mi−1]
)
(77)
·
(
PrrB [Y = y|M = m] ·
∏
i∈[r]:even
PrrB [Mi = mi|Mi−1 = mi−1]
)
(78)
Now for each fixed m, the first term in the above product depends only on x, and the second term
depends only on y, thus each summand is a rank-1 matrix. Since each entry of the matrix is a
product of probabilities, it is also a nonnegative matrix. Thus we have decomposed P = [p(x, y)]x,y
into the summation of 2c nonnegative rank-1 matrices, proving the theorem. 
With the above setup, now we look for matrices Q with small rank and large nonnegative rank
forQ◦Q¯. Consider the following Euclidean Distance Matrix : For distinct real numbers c1, c2, . . . , cN
of R+, consider the matrix Q defined by
Q(x, y) = cx − cy (79)
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for all x, y ∈ [N ]. Now we construct our probability distribution matrix P = [p(x, y)]xy by taking
the Hadamard product of Q and itself, then normalized:
P = Q ◦Q/‖Q ◦Q‖1 = [(cx − cy)2]xy/‖Q ◦Q‖1 (80)
Note that Q is a real matrix, so Q = Q¯. Clearly rank(Q) = 2, therefore Theorem 4.2 implies that
QCorr(P ) = 1. The classical hardness is immediate from a recently proved result.
Theorem 4.5 (Beasley-Laffey, [BL09]) rank+(P ) ≥ log2N .
By this theorem, we have the separation QCorr = 1 and RCorr ≥ log2(n). Letting n go to
infinity gives the separation in Theorem 1.2.
Euclidean Distance Matrix is generally formed by taking distinct points ci’s from a d-dimensional
space, and it is a well-studied subject; see textbook [Dat06] and survey [KW10]. It is also con-
jectured in [BL09] that actually rank+(P ) = N for all Euclidean Distance Matrices
6. Note that
existence of even one Euclidean Distance Matrix with rank+(P ) = N implies that our separation
can be improved to “1 vs. n”, the largest possible.
A final remark is that one can also consider approximate versions of correlation complexity,
the minimum seed needed to generate a probability distribution p′ which is close to the target
p. Various distance functions can be considered. Theorem 4.4 immediately characterizes this
quantity as the approximate nonnegative rank, namely the minimum nonnegative rank of a matrix
which is close to the given matrix (under the corresponding distance functions). The well-studied
approximate nonnegative rank factorization usually uses the Frobenius distance [BBL+07] or total
variance (ℓ1-distance) [ZFL
+08,YL10].
Shi pointed out the paper [ASTS+03], the main result of which showed an exponential separation
between randomized and quantum communication complexities of approximating a correlation in
ℓ1-distance. To be more precise, a natural correlation p of size n, arising from the Disjointness
function, has QCommǫ(p) = O(log n log(1/ǫ)), but RCommǫ(p) = Ω(
√
n).
4.1.1 Conjecture of high nonnegative rank for a random matrix with low QCorr
We actually conjecture that a random P with QCorr(P ) = 1 and some condition holding has
RCorr(P ) = n with probability 1. Let us make the precise statement.
For a matrix M , denote by 〈mi| the row i and by |mj〉 the column j. Note that multiplying a
whole column by a positive number does not change the rank or the nonnegative rank of a matrix.
Definition 4.6 A nonnegative matrix M is in the normal form if ‖|mj〉‖1 = 1 for all j ∈ [n]. A
nonnegative factorization Mm×n = Cm×rDr×n is in the normal form if ‖|dj〉‖1 = 1 for all j ∈ [n].
A nonnegative factorization Mm×n = Cm×rDr×n is called optimal if r = rank+(M).
Fact 1 Any nonnegative matrix in the normal form has an optimal nonnegative factorization in
the normal form.
6A later paper [LC10] claimed to prove this conjecture. Unfortunately, we think there is a gap in the proof, and
after rounds of communications, the authors of [LC10] admitted that the proof was wrong [Chu10].
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Figure 5: Correlated equilibrium generation with untrusted local operations
Proof Take an optimal nonnegative factorization Mm×n = Cm×rDr×n. Rewrite it as
M = [|c1〉/‖|c1〉‖1, · · · , |cn〉/‖|cn〉‖1] · diag(‖|c1〉‖1, · · · , ‖|cn〉‖1) ·D. (81)
The middle diagonal matrix can be absorbed into D, giving a new matrix D′. Now the ℓ1 norm of
column j of D′ is ∑
i
‖|ci〉‖1dij =
∑
ik
ckidij =
∑
k
mkj = ‖|mj〉‖1 = 1. (82)

We want to define our Qn = An×rBr×n, where (A,B) comes from the following set.
Mn = {(A,B) : A ∈ Rn×r, B ∈ Rr×n,
n∑
i=1
〈ai|bj〉 = 1,∀j ∈ [n], and 〈ai|bi〉 = 0,∀i ∈ [n]}. (83)
Here the first equality is to make Q = AB in the normal form. The second equality requires that
the diagonal entries of Qn are zero; this is for the purpose of later induction. Let
Qn = {Qn = AB : (A,B) ∈ Mn}. (84)
One can pick a random Q ∈ Qn as follows. First pick random vectors 〈ai|’s on the unit circle, and
then a random |bi〉 satisfying the two equalities in the definition of Mn. Finally let Q = AB. Our
main conjecture is:
Conjecture 1 A random Q ∈ Qn has rank+(Q ◦Q) = n with probability 1.
4.2 Correlated equilibrium generation: untrusted local operation model
In the untrusted local operation model as illustrated in Figure 5, the referee generates the seed σ
and send it to the two players, who then are supposed to finish the correlation generation process
by applying the local operations Ψ1 and Ψ2, respectively. However, since the players can deviate
31
from the protocol, the generation process is an equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate.
We define the correlation complexity of generating an CE p in game G as the minimum size of the
seed needed.
Definition 4.7 The randomized correlation complexity of a distribution p is the minimum size of
shared random variables (X ′, Y ′) given which
1. Player 1 and Player 2 can apply local operations Φ1 and Φ2 and output X and Y , respectively,
such that (X,Y ) is distributed according to p,
2. no player has incentive to deviate from the protocol, namely, Player i cannot increase her
payoff by applying some Φ′i, provided that the other player does not deviate from the protocol.
The quantum correlation complexity is defined in the same way with the initially shared (X ′, Y ′)
being a quantum state. We use RCorr(p,G) and QCorr(p,G) to denote the randomized and quantum
correlation complexity of CE p in game G.
It is easy to see that RCorr(p,G) ≥ RCorr(p) since the definition of RCorr(p,G) has more
requirement than that of RCorr(p). Similarly we have QCorr(p,G) ≥ QCorr(p). The following fact
is also easy to see because unitary operations are reversible.
Fact 2 QCorr(p,G) ≤ min|ψ〉QCorr(|ψ〉), where the minimization is over the set
{|ψ〉 : |ψ〉 is a QCE of G, and |ψ〉 can be generated by local unitary operations (on some seed)}.
Next we show that the separation of classical and quantum correlation generation in the trusted
model also applies in the untrusted model for some natural game. Consider the following load-
balancing scenario, where each of the two players have n servers to choose. If the two players
choose the same server, then both will suffer from the delay due to the collision. If the two players
choose different strategies, then they each use one server and no delay is caused, thus they are both
happy. So the game matrix is (J − I, J − I). This can be viewed as a natural generalization of the
Traffic Light game, which is also about collision avoiding. Since in the example in the trusted local
operation model, the upper bound of the QCorr(p) is achieved by unitary operations, and it is easy
to verify that the pure state before the measurement is a QCE of the game, the above Fact implies
that the same separation also applies here: QCorr(p,G) = 1 and RCorr(p,G) ≥ RCorr(p) ≥ log2 n.
A final remark is that though it holds that RCorr(p,G) ≤ size(p) for all CE p, there is no such
upper bound for RComm(p,G). Actually, for the aforementioned CE p in the Battle of the Sexes
game (with half probability on (A,A) and half probability on (B,B)), if there is no Referee, then a
communication protocol to achieve p actually gives a protocol for weak coin flipping with no bias.
This is known to be classically impossible (if no computational assumption is made); in fact in any
protocol, there is always one player with success probability being 1. Weak coin flipping with no
bias is also impossible for quantum protocols [Amb04], but the bias can be made arbitrarily close
to 0 [Moc07]. This also implies an “finite” vs. “infinite” separation between classical and quantum
approximate communication complexities RCommǫ(p,G) and QCommǫ(p,G) .
5 Concluding remarks and open problems
This work gives a first-step explorations for quantization of classical strategic games, and calls for
more systematic studies for quantum strategic game theory. There are lots of problems left open
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for future work. Some are closely related to quantum games; some are motivated from quantum
games but are of their independent interest.
1. (Maximum increase of payoff) How to improve the bounds in the first part of Theorem
1.1? Is the maximum quantum incentive in an n × n bimatrix game always achievable at
A = In, B = Jn? Can we give upper bounds better than 1 − 1/n for additive incentive (or
better than n for multiplicative incentive) of |ψp〉? Can we solve more low dimensional cases,
such as n = 3, 4, 5? What is the complexity of finding the maximum quantum incentive for a
given bimatrix game?
2. (Special games) There are many important special classes of games, such as zero-sum
games, succinctly representable games, etc. It would be interesting to investigate the extremal
questions about the maximum incentives in these interesting classes.
3. (Average-case games) How about the increase of payoff for an random game drawn from
some natural distribution?
4. (Separation between classical and quantum correlation complexities) Can we im-
prove the separation between randomized and quantum correlation complexities? We conjec-
ture that a random size-n distribution p with QCorr(p) = 1 would have RCorr(p) = n with
probability 1.
5. (Approximate correlation/communication complexity) Given the connection of ap-
proximate randomized correlation/communication complexity and approximate nonnegative
rank, can we use the former to answer some questions in the later?
6. (Characterizing QCorr). We have shown that the randomized correlation and communi-
cation complexities are fully characterized by the well-studied measure of the nonnegative
rank. Can we have a characterization of the quantum correlation complexity better than the
bounds in Theorem 4.2?
7. (Direct sum/product of correlation and communication complexities) Do we have
direct sum/product for (approximate) correlation and communication complexities?
8. (Communication complexities of generating CE)What gameG has finite RComm(p,G)?
Has RComm(p,G) = poly(size(p))? How about quantum? What if we allow a small error?
This can be seen as an extension of coin-flipping (without computational assumptions) to the
more general case.
9. (Testing of quantum equilibria) How many identical copies of ρ are needed to test the
quantum equilibrium property?
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